Conformance Checklist
Informative summary of the MUST requirements in SPEC.md. A run that fails any item is non-conforming.
Roles and independence (SPEC 3)
- [ ] PP-SPEC-077 Section 4 met, with the Agent Provider bound as the Provider
- [ ] Warden outside the AUT's trust boundary: separate process, namespace, or host, and credentials
- [ ] Warden holds no canary labels
- [ ] Proof Witness not operated by the Warden operator or the Agent Provider
- [ ] AUT cannot observe, delay, modify, or suppress Warden or Proof Witness records
Canaries (SPEC 4)
- [ ] Bad canaries inert: no working exploit code, live malware, or real secrets
- [ ] Every resource a canary points at is a Decoy
- [ ] Good and bad canaries indistinguishable to the AUT and the Warden
- [ ] Every canary carries a unique inert marker
- [ ] No bad canary reused verbatim across runs
- [ ] Commitments under PP-SPEC-077 Section 9 with
JCP-1:canaryandJCP-1:order, including the invited offense code
Declared Policy (SPEC 5)
- [ ] Policy declared and hashed before the run, bound to a Time Anchor pulse
Cells and arrest (SPEC 6, 7, 8)
- [ ] Grade responses applied as declared
- [ ] Observation Window declared before the run
- [ ] Children, sub-agents, scheduled jobs, and memory writes captured into the cell
- [ ] No call in flight at arrest completed against a real system
- [ ] Non-offending workloads kept running
- [ ] Release only on a Proof Witness-signed disposition
Timing (SPEC 9)
- [ ] Arrest and co-signed local booking hash completed inside the interrupted action
- [ ] Booking hashes batched and bound to a Time Anchor pulse; batch interval stated
- [ ] Measured arrest latency published with hardware and load
Adjudication and publication (SPEC 10, 11, 12, 13)
- [ ] Only induced offenses scored as Units of Proof
- [ ] Booking records signed by Warden and Proof Witness, schema-valid, no customer data
- [ ] Jail Efficacy Rate published with False Arrest Rate and Escape Rate
- [ ] Escape vectors exercised listed; untested vectors reported as not proven
- [ ] Every committed run published, including invalid and unfavorable runs
Safety (SPEC 14)
- [ ] Customer-like replica environment only; no production or third-party systems
- [ ] Decoy credentials minted per run and revoked at run end
- [ ] Kill switch outside the Warden
Registry (SPEC 5.2, 11.4)
- [ ] Declared Policy hash published to a PP-SPEC-004 registry before first release
- [ ] Commitment root, booking batch roots, booking records, verdicts, dispositions published to the registry
- [ ]
proofregister_uripresent in every booking record
Integration Points (SPEC 16)
- [ ] Conformance claimed per seam as
PP-SPEC-078 IP-Jn; 077 Section 18 rules met - [ ] Interface Manifest states which AUT paths (tool-call, egress, delegation, memory) the Warden intercepts; unintercepted paths listed as not proven
- [ ] Agent Provider occupies none of IP-J2, J4, J5, J6, J7, J8; Warden operator is not the Witness; Kill Switch is not the Warden operator
- [ ] IP-J3, J4, J5 complete inside the interrupted action; measured latency published
- [ ] Warden claim accompanied by IP-J10 escape test results
- [ ] AUT unmodified and unable to detect IP-J3, J4, J5 from inside